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INTRODUCTION

In 2015, the South Carolina Supreme Court rendered a decision that
uprooted a doctrine that had presumably been in effect since 1995.' Upon
considering the harsh result of a fire erupting from a chemical compound in
a warehouse, the state's highest court stated in dicta that the sophisticated
user doctrine was not the law in South Carolina, despite the implementation
and lengthy discussion of the doctrine by the appellate court in two separate
cases.2 By stating that the facts of the case did not fit with the doctrine, the
court dismantled a twenty-year-old defense, without running through the
proper analysis, in a couple of sentences that were unnecessary to its
ultimate holding: that the defendant was unable to avail itself of the
sophisticated user doctrine in order to prevent liability in the warning claim. 3
In the Lawing case, the plaintiffs employer purchased 170 tons of
sodium bromate from the defendant to use as an oxidizer to make precious
metals. 4 The bags of sodium bromate were labeled with a yellow oxidizer
symbol and information regarding the safe use of sodium bromate.5 Upon
delivery, the employer inspected the shipment of sodium bromate, noticed
the warning label and oxidizer symbol, and accepted the shipment. 6 The
purchaser then stored the sodium bromate in a location of the warehouse
where the plaintiff, who was a maintenance mechanic for the purchaser, was
to use a cutting torch to fix pipes on the ceiling.7 Despite the company's
policy that nothing was to be left in that area during maintenance, the work
on the pipes continued near the four crates of sodium bromate. Prior to

1.
Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing Il), 415 S.C. 209, 226, 781 S.E.2d 548, 557
n.14 (2015) (quoting Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 23, 749 S.E.2d 126,
131 (Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc.,
319 S.C. 531, 548, 550-51, 462 S.E.2d 321, 331-32 (Ct. App. 1995).
2.
See Lawing H1, 415 S.C. at 212, 229, 781 S.E.2d at 550, 558; Lawing I, 406 S.C. at
23-27, 749 S.E.2d at 131-33; Bragg, 319 S.C. at 549-51, 462 S.E.2d at 331-32.
3.
See Lawing H1, 415 S.C. at 226-28, 781 S.E.2d at 557-58.
4.
Lawing I, 406 S.C. at 17, 749 S.E.2d at 128.
5. Lawing H1, 415 S.C. at 213, 781 S.E.2d at 550.
6. Lawing 1, 406 S.C. at 18, 749 S.E.2d at 128. The employee inspecting the shipment
testified at trial that they "were able to determine the difference and notice that they were the
same thing because they do say 'sodium bromate' on them." Id
7.
Lawing H1, 415 S.C. at 212, 214, 781 S.E.2d at 550-51.
8.
Id at 214, 781 S.E.2d at 551. It was company policy that a "'hot work' permit" was
to be issued prior to any work in which an ignition source was used around flammable
materials. Lawing 1, 406 S.C. at 19-20, 749 S.E.2d at 129. The employees inspecting the area
in order to secure a hot work permit noticed the crates but were unable to identify what was
inside. Id. at 20, 749 S.E.2d at 129. Although company policy required that an inspector
contact a supervisor if he could not identify a substance, the inspectors here did not do so and
issued the permit without further investigating the substance in the bags. Id.
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performing the work, the plaintiff walked over to the crates and was unable
to see the labels and warnings on the bags because the crates were
individually shrink-wrapped. 9 After working on the pipes for two hours, a
piece of hot metal fell on one of the crates and resulted in the plaintiff being
engulfed in a "ball of fire."'o
It is the overall opinion of this Note that South Carolina should join the
majority of jurisdictions" and officially adopt the sophisticated user doctrine
as a defense for suppliers facing warning claims. Until 2015, the
sophisticated user doctrine was presumed to be a part of South Carolina
products liability jurisprudence. In 1982, the South Carolina Supreme Court
began to use language suggesting that a supplier is relieved of a duty to warn
of a danger associated with a product when the danger is "common
knowledge" to a lay person or to a professional working with that product.12
Although the opinion in that case does not specifically mention the
sophisticated user doctrine, it does reflect the prevailing logic that has given
rise to the implementation of the doctrine throughout the United States.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that South
Carolina would adopt the learned intermediary doctrine, a close cousin of
the sophisticated user doctrine,' 3 in the future since the doctrine is
"generally accepted and supported by sound policy."14 Although the court
made this statement with regard to the learned intermediary doctrine, similar
policies also justify the applicability of the sophisticated user doctrine, as
discussed more, infra.
In 1995, the South Carolina Court of Appeals joined numerous other
jurisdictions by directly supporting the use of the sophisticated user doctrine

9.
Lawing II, 415 S.C. at 214-15, 781 S.E.2d at 551. The plaintiff testified that he
noticed the bags in the work area and looked for a hazard symbol or "label . . that told [him]
[he] needed to move it," but he could not see the oxidizer symbol on each bag, so he carried on
with his work. Id. at 215, 781 S.E.2d at 551.
10. Id. at 215, 781 S.E.2d at 552.
11. See generally Mary-Christine Sungaila & Kevin C. Mayer, Limiting Manufacturers'
Duty to Warn: The Sophisticated User and PurchaserDoctrines, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 196, 196
(2009) (stating that, as of 2008, twenty-nine states have adopted the sophisticated user
doctrine).
12. Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 132 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982)
(holding that General Motors did not have a duty to warn about the impact that over-tightening
the lug-nuts on the tire could have on the functionality of the car).
13. See Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users:
Encouragingthe Use of Intermediariesto Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 1185, 1224 (1996).
14. Brook v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1984).
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in failure to warn claims." In addressing the appellant's claim that it was
error to charge the jury with the doctrine, the court of appeals recognized
that "numerous jurisdictions" had already adopted the doctrine in accordance
with section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.16 Although the court
never specifically used the words "we adopt the sophisticated user doctrine,"
the language in the case that the doctrine was "properly charged" suggests
that the court either presumed the doctrine to apply in South Carolina or was
advocating the use of the doctrine going forward.'"
The sophisticated user doctrine was again applied by the South Carolina
trial court and intermediate court in Lawing v. Trinity Manufacturing, Inc.
(Lawing 1).18 The intermediate court recognized that the doctrine had been
adopted in South Carolina in Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc.' 9 In addressing the
plaintiffs argument, the court specifically rejected the argument that the
sophisticated user doctrine was not part of South Carolina law. 20 Considered
along with the earlier Bragg decision, the Lawing case could have been an
important step in South Carolina law because it sought to dispel any
confusion as to whether the affirmative defense could be used by suppliers
when faced with a failure to warn claim.
However, despite all the evidence pointing in that direction, the South
Carolina Supreme Court stated that "neither this court, nor the court of
appeals, had explicitly adopted the defense." 2' The court of appeals clearly
thought to the contrary when it not only recognized that the doctrine was
adopted in Bragg but went a step further to provide "specific" language that
"specifically" implemented the doctrine. 22 In fact, the intermediate court

15. See Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 550, 462 S.E.2d 321, 332 (Ct. App.
1995) (concluding that "the trial court properly charged the jury concerning the sophisticated
user defense").
16. Id. at 549-50, 462 S.E.2d at 331-32. This section of the Restatement provides the
basis for the sophisticated user doctrine by allowing a supplier to rely on an employer or third
person to convey information regarding the safe use of the product to the ultimate user. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 388

cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

17. See Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550, 462 S.E.2d at 332.
18. Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 32-33, 749 S.E.2d 126, 136
(Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015).
19. Id. at 23, 749 S.E.2d at 131 (citing Bragg, 319 S.C. at 534-35, 549, 462 S.E.2d at
323-24, 331-32).
20. Id.
21. Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing II), 415 S.C. 209, 226, 781 S.E.2d 548, 557
(2015). The court explained that even though the Bragg court affirmed the use of the doctrine
and provided that it has been "adopted by a majority of jurisdictions," it had not explicitly
adopted the doctrine in South Carolina. Id. at 226, 781 S.E.2d at 557 n.14 (quoting Lawing I,
406 S.C. at 23, 749 S.E.2d at 131; Bragg, 319 S.C. at 548, 550-51, 462 S.E.2d at 331-32).
22. See Lawing 1, 406 S.C. at 25-26, 749 S.E.2d at 132-33 (citing O'Neal v. Celanese
Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1993)) ("Thus, the sophisticated user doctrine applies when
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began its analysis of the sophisticated user doctrine under a section titled
"The Sophisticated User Doctrine Is the Law in South Carolina." 23
Furthermore, the supreme court's statement here seems to be especially
controversial among other justices on the same court, where the separate
dissenting opinions by both Justice Kittredge and Justice Pleicones agree
that the doctrine had in fact been adopted in 1995 by the Bragg court. 24
One possible explanation for why the court did not recognize the
doctrine as being adopted may be because the court is holding itself out as
the only body that could properly adopt such a doctrine in South Carolina.
However, examining the specific language of the case-that "neither [the
supreme] [c]ourt, nor the court of appeals, had explicitly adopted the
defense" 25-the court seems to recognize that the court of appeals does in
fact have the authority to adopt legal doctrines, which undermines this
explanation of the court's holding. This raises the question: why did the
court think it necessary to include this language in the opinion at all? If the
facts of the case did not justify the use of the doctrine, then the court could
have gone through a sophisticated user analysis and concluded that the
doctrine did not apply. But going the extra step by stating that the doctrine
was never specifically adopted in South Carolina has only created confusion
in an area presumably settled in 1995. The confusion is this: did the court
kill the viability of the defense in South Carolina, or did it leave the door
open for the defense to be applied in the future if the facts so permit?
Part II of this Note gives a brief background of products liability
generally, explains warning claims in products liability actions, discusses the
sophisticated user doctrine as applied by other jurisdictions, addresses the
two separate theories of the sophisticated user doctrine, 26 and notes the
doctrine's relation to and confusion with the similar learned intermediary
doctrine and bulk supplier doctrine. Part III of this Note explores the
framework of sections 388 and 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and provides a solution to the current state of confusion in South Carolina by
proposing that the supreme court adopt the balancing approach of the
sophisticated user doctrine. Part IV will further discuss the Lawing v.

there is evidence the seller of a product was aware that an intermediate purchaser understood
the dangers associated with the product and had the ability to effectively communicate those
dangers to the end user.").
23. Id. at 23, 749 S.E.2d at 131.
24. Lawing H1, 415 S.C. at 229, 781 S.E.2d at 559 (Kittredge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550, 462 S.E.2d at 332); id. at 231, 781 S.E.2d at
560 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 226, 781 S.E.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
26. The two theories of the doctrine that jurisdictions have differed on are the duty
approach and the balancing approach. Ausness, supra note 13, at 1203.
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Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing l) holding, why it was unnecessary for the court
to deny the adoption of the doctrine in South Carolina, and the practicable
problems created by the opinion going forward.
II.

BACKGROUND OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

Generally, a products liability claim is brought against a supplier or
manufacturer of a product for a defect in the product that resulted in the
injury of the claimant. 27 A claimant has the option of bringing suit under a
number of different theories, including negligence, strict liability, breach of
warranty, or tortious misrepresentation. 28 Regardless of the theory that the
claim is brought under, a claimant must generally be able to establish "(1)
that he was injured by the product; (2) that the product, at the time of the
accident, was in essentially the same condition as when it left the hands of
the defendant; and (3) that the injury occurred because the product was in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user." 29 Typically, in
alleging a defect in a product, a claimant will specifically focus on either the
defective design, warning, or manufacturing of the product.30
This Note is particularly concerned with warnings defects brought under
either a theory of negligence or strict liability. It is well-recognized that a
supplier or manufacturer has a duty to warn users or consumers about any
dangers associated with the product that could foreseeably harm users or
consumers. 3 ' However, the duty may extend even further to require a
supplier or manufacturer of a product to supply proper instructions or
directions on how to use the product safely. 32

27. See RACHEL M. KANE, 30 S.C. JUR. ProductsLiability § 1 (2017).
28. Id.
29. Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc., 332 S.C. 422, 426, 505 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Ct. App.
1998) (quoting Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 580, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1985));
Bragg, 319 S.C. at 539, 462 S.E.2d at 326.
30. KANE, supra note 27 (citing Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011))
("Products-liability law establishes a classic and well known [sic] triumvirate of grounds for
liability: defective manufacture, inadequate directions or warnings, and defective design.").
31. Ausness, supra note 13, at 1187-88.

32.

See generally Tompkins v. Log Sys., Inc., 385 S.E.2d 545 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)

(holding that a supplier of a "do-it-yourself' log construction system failed to provide
adequate instruction about how to properly assemble the log home).
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Strict Liability in Warning Claims

One of the ways a supplier may be held liable for a defective warning or
instruction is by strict products liability.33 Unlike a negligence claim, strict
liability focuses on the product itself and holds a manufacturer or seller
liable for the product's unreasonably defective condition.3 4 According to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, a supplier may be held liable under a strict
liability theory for injuries caused by a defective condition of the product
regardless of the degree of care exercised by the supplier if the product is
unreasonably dangerous.3 5 Even in the instance where the product has been
properly designed or manufactured, it may be considered unreasonably
dangerous if the supplier fails to adequately warn of dangers associated with
the product.3 6 However, this duty to warn only exists in certain
circumstances. It is well-established, and accepted by many jurisdictions,
that a supplier need not warn of dangers that are obvious or generally
appreciated by the public.37
Further, a supplier's duty to warn only extends to users or consumers of
the product.38 However, section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code does
not provide a definition for what "consumer" or "user" means. 39 Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a user or consumer
is one that may be "passively enjoying the benefit of the product" or
"utilizing it for the purpose of doing work upon it. "40 In fact, the user or
consumer is not even required to have been a direct purchaser of the product
from the supplier. 41 The product could have been acquired by an employer,

33.
34.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

35.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

Id.

§

402A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). A supplier or

seller of a product can be liable under this theory even if it has exercised "all possible
reasonable care in the preparation and sale of the product." Id. § 402A cmt. a. However, the
reasonableness standard is still central to a warning claim even if brought under strict liability.
See, e.g., Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1985).
36. Ausness, supra note 13, at 1189.
37. Id. at 1190. It is important to note that this standard is meant to be an objective
standard, not one focused on the actual knowledge of the user. See, e.g., Fleck v. KDI Sylvan
Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 119 (3rd Cir. 1992).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (2005) ("One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer.") (emphasis added).
39. Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing II), 415 S.C. 209, 221, 781 S.E.2d 548, 554
(2015).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
(providing the example of one who is a passenger in an automobile or airplane, or as one
performing work upon the automobile that he has purchased).
41. Id.§402Acmt.l.
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family member, or given to the user by a donor. 42 Even though this
definition of user or consumer is rather broad, it likely does not extend to
those injured by the product who are mere bystanders. 43
B. Negligence in Warning Claims
On the contrary, a negligence claim focuses on the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's or seller's conduct.44 Under a negligence theory for failure to
warn, in order to show that the defendant breached his duty of due care, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) the supplier knew or should have known that the
product could be dangerous under foreseeable use; (2) the supplier was
aware that the user would not be aware of the dangerous condition of the
product; and (3) the supplier nonetheless failed to exercise reasonable care to
warn the user of the condition. 45
For those situations where a warning is required and given, the mere fact
that the supplier provides a warning is not always enough to escape possible
liability. The warning must be adequate and reasonable under the particular
circumstances, which may be concerned with things like disclosing the risk
of harm, the gravity of such harm, the physical format of the warning, the
proper amount of intensity as compared to the degree of harm, whether the
warning was unambiguous and clear to the average reader, and whether the
warning was communicated through appropriate means. 46

42. Id. ("In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, it is not necessary that the
ultimate user or consumer have acquired the product directly from the seller, although the rule
applies equally if he does so. He may have acquired it through one or more intermediate
dealers. It is not even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at all. He may
be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee, or a guest at his table, or a
mere donee from the purchaser. The liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any
contractual relation, or privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the defendant.").
43. Id. § 402A cmt. o ("Thus far the courts, in applying the rule stated in this Section,
have not gone beyond allowing recovery to users and consumers, as those terms are defined in
Comment 1. Casual bystanders, and others who may come in contact with the product, as in the
case of employees of the retailer, or a passer-by injured by an exploding bottle, or a pedestrian
hit by an automobile, have been denied recovery.").
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § I cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998);
see, e.g., Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 539, 462 S.E.2d 321, 326 (Ct. App. 1995)
("[U]nder a negligence theory, ... the focus is on the conduct of the seller or manufacturer,
and liability is determined according to fault.").
45. Ausness, supranote 13, at 1188.
46. Id. at 1192-95.
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The Sophisticated User Doctrine as a Defense Against Warning
Claims

One recognized exception to a supplier's duty to warn, under both
negligence and strict products liability, comes in the form of the
sophisticated user doctrine. A supplier may not need to warn a
knowledgeable user or purchaser of the dangers associated with a product if
that person has special knowledge of the product's dangers. 47 Although the
sophisticated user doctrine may be implemented when the user is the direct
purchaser of the product from the supplier, it may also be applicable when
the purchaser then allows another third party to use the product. 48 As stated
in comment 1 of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, this
"third party" could be an employee of the purchaser. 49 In this event, if the
purchaser/employer knows or should have known of the dangers associated
with the product because of experience or expertise, the supplier is not
required to warn the third-party user; rather, it becomes the purchaser's
responsibility to provide an adequate warning.o
The rationale behind the doctrine is to relieve suppliers of the burden of
warning when it becomes overly difficult or even impossible to directly
warn end users." Although the law generally encourages suppliers of
products to provide warnings directly to users, there are some circumstances
where it may not be practicable. For example, a supplier or manufacturer
may have very limited contact with users or limited knowledge of who could
potentially be in danger,5 2 such as in an industrial context where a product
passes through several chains prior to reaching the user.53 Even when a
direct warning may be appropriate, problems can arise when a warning
attached to a product is long and detailed in order to properly describe
possible hazards.5 4 In this event, users may not read the entire warning or be

47. Id. at 1200-03.
48. See O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1993) (providing the
example of a situation where "A supplies a chattel to B, B in turn allows C to be exposed to
the chattel, C is injured by exposure to the chattel, and C claims that A should be liable to C
for A's failure to warn C of the danger").
49.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A

cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

50. See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 552, 560-61 (W.D. Va. 1984).
51. Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 24, 749 S.E.2d 126, 132 (Ct.
App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015); Kenneth M. Willner, Failures to
Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 VA. L. REV. 579, 585 (1988).
52. Willner, supra note 51, at 584.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 585.
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able to fully understand the threat." However, the original purchaser of the
product who may be the employer of ultimate users will be in a better
position to directly warn all ultimate users of the dangers associated with the
product. 56
1.

Two-Party SophisticatedUser

The sophisticated user doctrine is most commonly used in what this
Note calls the two-party context. This form of the doctrine has emerged from
the well-known open and obvious danger rule, discussed more in Part III,
where the user of a product is knowledgeable about the product."7 A supplier
or manufacturer, therefore, does not have a duty to warn sophisticated users
of the product since it already knows or should have known of the specific
danger that caused the harm."8 The underlying rationale in the two-party
context is that a warning would not have changed the sophisticated user's
behavior since the user already had knowledge of the dangers associated
with the product.5 9
Accordingly, courts typically look at the knowledge of the user at the
time of the accident to determine whether the doctrine should apply.60 If at
the time of the accident the user already had actual or constructive
knowledge of the risks associated with the specific use of the product, then
the absence of the warning could not have been the cause of the injuries. 61
2.

Three-PartySophisticated User

A slightly different variation of the sophisticated user doctrine is in what
this Note calls the three-party context (sometimes referred to by others as the
sophisticated purchaser doctrine). 62 The most common form of the threeparty sophisticated user doctrine is when a supplier distributes a product to a
sophisticated purchaser, who then passes the product along to be used by its

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, § 9:28 Persons to be Warned The
Professionalsor Sophisticated User, in PRODUCTS LIABILITY, at 1 n. 1(4th ed. 2017).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., id. at 2 (citing Exparte Chevron Chem. Co., 720 So. 2d 922, 925-26 (Ala.
1998); Bakunas v. Life Pack, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D. La. 1982); Ziglar v. E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co., 280 S.E.2d 510, 515 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)).
60. See, e.g., id. (citing Johnson v. Am. Standard, Inc., 43 Cal. 4th 56, 65 (2008)).
61. See OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 57.
62. Id.
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employee(s) or other third party. 63 Unlike the two-party context, the end user
is not always sophisticated with the product; rather, the purchaser
(employer/intermediary) that supplies the product to the end user is
knowledgeable about the dangers of the product, and it is that party's
sophistication that is important for the application of the doctrine in the
three-party setting.64
However, in order for the doctrine to apply in this context, the supplier
has the burden of demonstrating its awareness with the purchaser's
sophistication and capability to pass this knowledge on to ultimate users. 65
Thus, when the purchaser of the product has knowledge of the product equal
to that of the supplier, the supplier "may be able to rely on the
employer/purchaser to protect its own employees from harm." 66 If, however,
the supplier is unable to provide evidence that the employer would or did
pass along information to the end user, then it may be deemed to have been
unreasonable for the supplier to rely on the purchaser rather than supplying
warnings directly to the end user.67
3.

Two Approaches in Applying the Sophisticated UserDoctrine

While many jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine, courts have taken
two varying approaches when implementing the sophisticated user doctrine:
the duty approach and the balancing of factors approach. 68 Under the duty
approach in the three-party context, the supplier's actual duty can be
satisfied or even waived in two circumstances: (1) where the purchaser has
been warned by the supplier of the dangers of the product and then assumes
the duty to warn subsequent users; and (2) where the supplier has not warned

63. See generally, e.g., Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming the
application of the sophisticated user defense where the plant that the plaintiff worked at was
sophisticated in the dangers of silica and holding that the supplier had no duty to warn the user
directly); Roney v. Gencorp, 654 F. Supp. 2d 501 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (applying the doctrine
where the defendant supplied a chemical to the plaintiffs employer who was sophisticated
with the dangers of the product, even though the plaintiff was not).
64. See Willis v. Raymark Indus., 905 F.2d 793, 796 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Simply stated,
the sophisticated user defense may be permitted in cases involving an employer who was
aware of the inherent dangers of a product which the employer purchased for use in its
business."); see also OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 57.
65. See Willis, 905 F.2d at 797; OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 57 (citing McConnell v.
Union Carbide Corp., 937 So. 2d 148, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
66. Willis, 905 F.2d at 796.
67. OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 57 (citing Adkins v. GAF Corp., 923 F.2d 1225, 1230
(6th Cir. 1991) (where a supplier of asbestos could not use the sophisticated user doctrine since
it had knowledge of hazardous operations at the employer/purchaser's facility)).
68. Ausness, supra note 13, at 1203.
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the purchaser, but the duty is nonetheless waived because the purchaser is
already aware of the product's dangers. 69 Although implemented by some
courts in the three-party context, 70 the duty approach is most congruent with
the two-party context since the user is also the one with heightened
knowledge of the product. The duty approach in the two-party context
furthers the rationale of the open and obvious danger rule, regardless of
whether a negligence or strict liability claim is brought, since it is wellknown that suppliers do not have a duty to warn of dangers already known
'

to the user.7

In the three-party context, where an employer purchases a product that
its employees will use, a supplier only has a duty to warn the employer if the
employer is not knowledgeable of the product. 72 Yet, under this approach,
the supplier does not have a duty to warn the purchaser if the purchaser is
knowledgeable. 73 So this approach inherently focuses on the purchaser's
actual knowledge rather than the supplier's conduct.74
On the other hand, the balancing approach is less focused on the
supplier's actual duty to warn and more focused on the reasonableness of the
supplier's actions in relying on the knowledge of the purchaser or user.7 5
This approach stems from section 388, comment n of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,76 which provides a list of several factors that should be
considered in determining whether the supplier acted reasonably by relying
on the purchaser to warn any subsequent users.7 7 For instance, in a threeparty context, a supplier may rely on the purchaser to warn end users unless
the supplier knows nothing about the purchaser's character or knows the

69. Id. at 1204 (citing Rusin v. Glendale Optical Co., 805 F.2d 650, 654 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the supplier of protective eyeglass lenses was not required to warn an employee
when the employer had specialized knowledge of the intricacies of protective eyeglass
lenses)).
70. See, e.g., Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882, 887 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing
Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603, 606 (6th Cir. 1957)); Willner, supra note 51,
at 591 (citing Cook v. Branick Mfg., Inc., 736 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1984)).
71. See Webb v. Special Elec. Co., 370 P.3d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 2016).
72. Willner, supra note 51, at 591.
73. Id. at 591-92.
74. Id. at 592.
75. Ausness, supranote 13, at 1205-06.
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965). These
factors include considering the character of the "intermediary," the purpose for which the
product is to be used, and a comparison of the burden of warning the end users with the
magnitude of harm that could come from the product's dangerous condition. Id.; see also
Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 464 (Md. Ct. App. 1992); Ausness, supra note
13, at 1206-07.
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purchaser to be careless." When evaluating whether a supplier breached a
duty to warn by relying on the purchaser to warn end users, the court may
wish to consider (1) the gravity of risk associated with the product; (2) the
likelihood that the purchaser will convey information about the product to
end users; and (3) the feasibility and effectiveness of a supplier giving a
warning directly to the end user(s). 7
Therefore, in order for the supplier to reasonably rely on the purchaser
to warn subsequent users, the supplier may be required to make a showing
that it had knowledge of the user's sophistication with the product prior to
shipping.s0 This approach is attractive to many jurisdictions that have
adopted the sophisticated user doctrine because placing the focus on the
supplier's conduct rather than the purchaser's is more consistent with the
duty and breach elements of a negligence claim." Thus, the crucial
difference between the balancing approach and the duty approach is that,
under the balancing approach, the focus is on the supplier's conduct and
whether a duty was breached by relying on the purchaser, not whether the
supplier had a duty to warn in the first place.8 2
D.

The Learned IntermediaryDoctrine and Bulk Supplier Doctrine

The learned intermediary doctrine and bulk supplier doctrine are similar
to the sophisticated user doctrine in theory. The learned intermediary
doctrine is similar to the duty approach of the sophisticated user doctrine in
that a supplier of prescription drugs or medical supplies only has a duty to
warn physicians about the dangers of the product. 83 If the supplier gives an
adequate warning or instruction to the physician, the duty to warn ultimate

78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
80. See Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 26, 749 S.E.2d 126, 132
(Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015); see also Bragg v. Hi-Ranger,
Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 550, 462 S.E.2d 321, 332 (Ct. App. 1995).
81. See Willner, supra note 51, at 596-97.
82. O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251-52 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Kennedy v.
Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)).
83. See Ausness, supra note 13, at 1196-97; see also Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750
F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the supplier of a pacemaker only had a duty to
warn a physician of the dangers associated with the product rather than directly to the user).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying South Carolina law, stated that "[a]lthough
the South Carolina Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, we conclude that it would
adopt the rule . . ., restricting the manufacturer's duty to warn to the prescribing physician."
Brooks, 750 F.2d at 1231.
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users then shifts to the physician. 84 The rationale behind this doctrine is that
physicians are likely in a better place to understand warnings and relay them
to users in plain language since physicians have the medical training
necessary to understand warnings about the medical product. 85
The bulk supplier doctrine, however, is very similar to the sophisticated
user doctrine.8 6 Some courts have recognized it as a separate theory, while
others have treated it as more of a specialized form of the sophisticated user
doctrine." Like the sophisticated user doctrine, the bulk supplier doctrine
may be analyzed under either a duty approach or balancing approach under
the Restatement." The application of either approach is much the same. The
duty approach may require a supplier to warn the purchaser or rely on the
purchaser's knowledge to warn ultimate users, while the balancing approach
focuses on whether the supplier was reasonable in relying on the purchaser
to pass along the information about the product.8 9 The rationale for this
doctrine is that it may be overly burdensome or even impossible for a
supplier of bulk products to warn ultimate users since there may not be an
effective and efficient way to do so. 90 Courts typically apply the doctrine
where the product being sold is not the type to be packaged or placed in a
container, and thus cannot be properly labeled. 9' Therefore, when bulk
suppliers of raw materials, which cannot be readily labeled, ship products to
knowledgeable purchasers, the supplier may rely on the purchaser to convey
warnings about the product to all subsequent users. 92

84. Ausness, supra note 13, at 1196-97 (quoting Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370
F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966)).
85. Id. at 1200 (stating that courts have held that physicians are in a better position to
interpret and relay information regarding both medical devices and drugs to ultimate users)
(citing Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Md. 1989)).
86. Id. at 1217.
87. Id. at 1216-17.
88. Id. at 1217.
89. See id. at 1219-21.
90. Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Effective Communication of Warnings
in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in Working with Industrial Materials, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1,
19(2008).
9 1. Id.
92. Id.
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III. ARGUMENTS

OF
THE
RATIONALE
FOR
THE ADOPTION
AND
SOPHISTICATED USER DOCTRINE AS A DEFENSE AGAINST WARNING
CLAIMS

South Carolina should officially adopt the sophisticated user doctrine for
many reasons. First, the doctrine is a logical extension from the well-known
rule that suppliers do not have a duty to warn of open and obvious dangers.
Second, the sophisticated user doctrine encourages safe behavior on the part
of purchasers in a three-party context and places the duty of warning on the
party most capable of relaying efficient warnings to end users. Third, the
doctrine promotes fairness for both a supplier and plaintiff in warning
claims. Fourth, adopting the doctrine will dispel confusion in South Carolina
as to where other defenses, like comparative fault and the empty chair
defense, end and the sophisticated user defense begins. Fifth, adopting the
balancing approach under section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
will provide fairness for both suppliers and injured users.
A.

Open and Obvious Danger Rule Laying the Groundworkfor the
SophisticatedUser Doctrine

The sophisticated user doctrine should be adopted in South Carolina
since it provides a necessary extension from the open and obvious danger
rule. The sophisticated user doctrine is necessary for several reasons, despite
its similarity to the open and obvious danger rule. First, the two-party
context, although similar in practice to the open and obvious danger rule,
focuses on the user's knowledge of specific dangers, as opposed to dangers
that are generally known to all users. Second, the open and obvious danger
rule does not go far enough to provide for suppliers in three-party contexts,
where the purchaser is the one with the heightened knowledge but is not the
one ultimately injured.
First, the open and obvious danger rule relieves a supplier from the
burden of warning a user when the danger is generally known.9 3 For those
that are deemed to be sophisticated users of a product in a two-party context,
relieving the supplier of its usual duty to warn seems to be a logical
extension of the well-founded rule that suppliers do not have to warn about
"open and obvious dangers." 94 Although South Carolina's highest court has
not adopted the sophisticated user doctrine, it is well-recognized within

93. Id. at 21.
94. See id.; see also Koken v. Black & Veach Const., 426 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 2005)
("[N]o duty to warn sophisticated users of dangers that are obvious to reasonable sophisticated
users . . . is simply a corollary of the open and obvious doctrine.").
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South Carolina jurisprudence that a supplier does not have a duty to warn of
dangers or potential dangers that are "generally known and recognized." 95
1.

Open and Obvious DangerRule and its Relation to Two-Party
Sophisticated UserDoctrine

In the two-party context, where a sophisticated user purchases a product
from the supplier for his or her own use, the supplier does not have a duty to
warn the user of dangers known or foreseeable since the user's knowledge of
the product essentially makes the dangers "generally known and recognized"
as to that specific user. 96 In the three-party context, where the purchaser is a
sophisticated user and provides the product to be used by a third party, the
purchaser may inherit from the supplier the duty to provide warnings to all
subsequent users. 97 The distinction is that the open and obvious danger
doctrine applies to all potential users and generally known dangers, whereas
the sophisticated user doctrine is much more reliant on the specific user's
knowledge of the dangers associated with the product. Although the
doctrines are very similar in the two-party context, the distinction between
the two is important since there are circumstances where a specific danger
may be "obvious" to a trained professional or similarly educated user but not
to a general user of the product. In this event, the open and obvious danger
doctrine does not go far enough to provide a meaningful defense for the
supplier.
Furthermore, courts need not worry about the sophisticated user doctrine
providing blanket protection for a supplier. Application of the doctrine to
shield a supplier from liability is still a fact-intensive process to determine if
the user was sophisticated with the specific danger that caused the injury.
For example, some courts have held that a supplier may still have to provide
warnings to a sophisticated user of particular risks associated with the

95. Moore v. Barony House Rest., LLC, 382 S.C. 35, 41-42, 674 S.E.2d 500, 504 (Ct.
App. 2009) (citing Anderson v. Green Bull, Inc., 322 S.C. 268, 271-72, 471 S.E.2d 708, 710
(Ct. App. 1996)).
96. See id. at 42, 674 S.E.2d at 504 ("[T]he operation of an unlighted golf car on a
public highway at night presents an open and obvious risk."). Therefore, the golf car was not
rendered unreasonably dangerous by the seller's failure to warn. Id.; see also Webb v. Special
Elec. Co., 370 P.3d 1022, 1035 (Cal. 2016) ("[K]nowledge of a product's risks is the
equivalent of prior notice.").
97. Ausness, supra note 13, at 1206. Some jurisdictions refer to the three-party context
described above as a sophisticatedpurchaser doctrine, while the two-party context, where the
purchaser is the sophisticated user, is encompassed by the sophisticated user doctrine. OWEN
& DAVIS, supra note 57. For the purposes of this Note, the term "sophisticated user doctrine"
will be used interchangeably to refer to both the two- and three-party contexts.
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product that the sophisticated user may not appreciate. 98 So, even though the
user may be generally sophisticated with the use of the product, a supplier
may still be held liable if the facts suggest that the user was not sophisticated
as to a specific risk that ultimately caused the injury, and the supplier
negligently failed to warn of the specific risk or the warning was defective. 99
2.

Open and Obvious DangerRule and its Relation to Three-Party
SophisticatedUser Doctrine

Second, the open and obvious danger rule provides a gateway into the
three-party sophisticated user doctrine, the bulk supplier doctrine, and the
learned intermediary doctrine, which is especially helpful since courts
commonly mix the doctrines together anyway. 00 The same basic logic
supporting the open and obvious danger rule also supports the three other
supplier doctrines listed above.101 In the three-party context discussed,
supra, each doctrine has the same underlying premise: that suppliers may
rely on knowledgeable purchasers to relay warnings to ultimate users.1 02 in
relying on the purchaser to warn, the supplier is recognizing that it may
fulfill its duty to warn by providing safety information to the purchaser of
the product and relying on its knowledge of the product to be passed along
to the ultimate user(s). However, unlike the two-party context, the dangers
of the product are not "obvious" to the user but are to the sophisticated
purchaser. Thus, the distinction between the two doctrines is even more
important where the product is being sold to one party but passed along for
use by a third party.
In this situation, the open and obvious danger rule would not protect the
supplier even if it was reasonable for the supplier to rely on the purchaser to
warn end users since the dangers would have only been "generally known"
to the purchaser not the user. In this event, suppliers would be required to

98. See Koken, 426 F.2d at 46. The court provides an example of when a supplier of
commercial trucks does not have a duty to warn truck drivers of the risk of accidents on
highways but may still have a duty to warn about the risks of rollovers if the truck is loaded
past a certain weight threshold. Id.; see also Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21,
29 (1st Cir. 2004) (where an experienced user of a mechanical saw conceded that he was
aware that the blade continued to spin after using the machine to cut wood but claimed that he
was not aware of exactly how long the blade would spin).
99. See Koken, 426 F.2d at 45-46.
100. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 90, at 21-22 ("[T]he sophisticated user doctrine,
which is commonly analyzed in conjunction with the bulk supplier doctrine, further mixes with
the rationale underlying the learned intermediary doctrine.").
101. See id. at 22 n.115.
102. In re TMJ Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 1019, 1029 (D. Minn. 1995).
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warn all users of every fathomable danger to shield themselves from
liability, a scenario of particular concern to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals in ONeal v. Celanese Corp. 103 The effect of such a requirement
would essentially expose every supplier to absolute liability for every claim
brought under negligence or strict liability. 104
Therefore, even though the open and obvious danger rule lays the
framework for the sophisticated user doctrine, it does not go far enough to
protect a supplier where a user was injured by the product and was either
sophisticated in the use of the product or received the product from a
sophisticated purchaser that was in a suitable position to pass along safety
information.
B. Efficiency, Capability, and Fairnessin Three-PartyContext
While the sophisticated user doctrine is a much easier sell for the twoparty context, the application of the doctrine in the three-party context can
seem a little more difficult to apply since the end user may not be
sophisticated to the same degree as the purchaser. This is evidenced by
South Carolina's highest court in Lawing II.0 5 Nonetheless, the doctrine
should be adopted in South Carolina, even in the three-party context,
because it encourages responsible behavior by purchasers that are
sophisticated in the use of the product.1 06 Whether under a duty approach or
Restatement (Second) of Torts balancing approach, the sophisticated user
doctrine cuts off liability for suppliers when purchasers of a product are
sophisticated users and the supplier's conduct was reasonable. 0 7 The
doctrine is necessary to prevent circumstances where a supplier is held liable
even though a warning would not have prevented the injury.0 8 Although the

103. O'Neal v. Celanese Corp., 10 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Kennedy v.
Mobay Corp., 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990)) (stating that "the defense is
not only logical but necessary" and that without it "strict liability would become, in effect,
absolute liability").
104. See id.
105. Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing II), 415 S.C. 209, 226, 781 S.E.2d 548, 557
n.14 (2015) (quoting Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 23, 749 S.E.2d 126,
131 (Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015)).
106. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 90, at 21.
107. See, e.g., id. at 20 ("[T]he sophisticated user doctrine, like the bulk supplier
doctrine, places liability with the party in the best position-defined here as the most
knowledgeable or informed position-to prevent harm.").
108. See id. at 26 (citing Wood v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 119 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2003)); Hargis v. Doe, 443 N.E.2d 1008, 1011 (Ohio 1981) (where the supplier of a
solvent sent the solvent to the purchaser in drums without warnings, but the plaintiff
(employee of purchaser) never saw the drums and only had access to the solvent once it was
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Whitehead v. Dycho Co. and Hargis v. Doe cases demonstrate causation
issues in a negligence claim for failure to warn, the facts of both cases also
justify the need for the sophisticated user doctrine where the supplier has a
diminished capacity to provide warnings to end users. Such circumstances
were considered by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,
where one of the factors to be considered in the balancing approach is the
ability of the supplier to communicate warnings to ultimate users.1 09 In
many industrial settings, where a product sold by a supplier will be used or
integrated into another product, the purchaser is in the best place to warn
ultimate users of the dangers associated with the product.
Yet, as demonstrated in the cases discussed, supra, a highly factdependent analysis is necessary to determine if the doctrine should apply." 0
The Lawing I opinion is a good example of a court running through the
varying factors that must be present in order for the doctrine to shield a
supplier from liability. The court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs argument
that the sophisticated user doctrine was not the law of South Carolina and
held that the trial court was correct in charging the jury with the defense."
The court reasoned that it was proper for the supplier to rely on the
purchaser in this instance because the purchaser was highly sophisticated in
the use of sodium bromate and had extensive safety protocols in effect when
handling dangerous substances.11 2 However, the supreme court reversed that
decision and stated that a sophisticated user analysis is unnecessary on the

removed from the drums); Whitehead v. Dycho Co., 775 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tenn. 1989)
(applying the sophisticated user doctrine where the supplier of a flammable chemical warned
the knowledgeable purchaser directly that the chemical was flammable and placed warning
labels on the fifty-five gallon drums, but the purchaser removed the product from the original
packaging, and the plaintiff was subsequently injured).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1998)
(identifying three factors in determining the reasonableness of a supplier relying on a
purchaser to convey warnings: "the gravity of the risks posed by the product, the likelihood
that the intermediary will convey the information to the ultimate user, and the feasibility and
effectiveness of giving a warning directly to the user") (emphasis added); Sungaila & Mayer,
supra note 11, at 201.
110. Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 25, 749 S.E.2d 126, 132 (Ct.
App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015) ("To understand the sophisticated user
doctrine, it is particularly important that when determining whether any defendant acted with
reasonable care, the jury should consider all the surrounding facts and circumstances.").
111. Lawing I, 406 S.C. at 23, 749 S.E.2d at 131 (stating that such an argument was
"refuted . . years ago in Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 462 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App.
1995)").
112. Id. at 30, 749 S.E.2d at 135.
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facts of the case because the labeling of the sodium bromate was defective,
making the rest of its discussion on the sophisticated user doctrine dicta.113
There are two problems with the court's treatment of the sophisticated
user doctrine in Lawing H. First, the doctrine should shield a supplier when a
negligent purchaser was more capable of providing efficient warnings to the
end user. Second, the court overlooks the fairness aspect that the balancing
approach of the doctrine provides to both the supplier and plaintiff.
1.

Efficiency and Capability

The sophisticated user doctrine arguably furthers the deterrence goals of
tort and products liability law by placing the duty to warn on the party most
capable of communicating safety information to end users.11 4 The supplier
of a product is likely in the best position to generate safety information
about the known risks of the product since the supplier has control over the
ultimate design of the product." 5 On the other hand, where a purchaser of a
product uses the product for further processing of a separate product (as was
the case in Lawing), the purchaser is in a better position to communicate
safety information to end users (e.g., employees). 116 This is the case because
a supplier of materials may fix a label or warning on the product, but the
employees of the purchaser who are "using" the product may not see the
label or understand its content." 7 This places the purchaser of a product that
has the intention to incorporate or use the product to develop a finished
product in a better position to directly warn employees in a more effective
way." 8
The costs of avoiding an accident are thus placed on the "cheapest cost
avoider" when purchasers of a product have the duty to warn employees of
the dangers of the product, rather than the supplier.119 This arguably will
increase the effectiveness of warnings and achieve the injury deterrence goal
of tort and products liability law since the employer is in a better place than

113. Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing Il), 415 S.C. 209, 227, 781 S.E.2d 548, 558
(2015) ("[T]here is a critical distinction between an intermediary's knowledge of the . .
nature of a product, and the ability of the third-party user to identify and recognize [the]
product on its face.").
114. See Ausness, supra note 13, at 1226.

115. See id. at 1227.
116. See id. at 1228-29.
117. See id. at 1232; see also Lawing II, 415 S.C. at 227, 781 S.E.2d at 558 (where
warning labels were fixed to the individual bags of sodium bromate, but the plaintiff was
unable to see them because the crate was still shrink-wrapped from delivery).
118. See Ausness, supra note 13, at 1232.

119. See id. at 1235.
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upstream suppliers to convey direct and real life warnings to ultimate
users. 120 If the duty to warn end users directly is placed on both the supplier
and purchaser, the costs of warning go up.' 2' A supplier will thus fall back
on the purchaser's duty to warn and vice versa. This in turn will decrease the
effectiveness of the warning since neither party will have the incentive to
provide a comprehensive warning to the end user. Yet these costs must still
be factored into the balancing analysis and weighed against other factors to
consider. If the costs of requiring the supplier to warn are substantially less
than the dangerousness of the product, then the sophisticated user doctrine
may not protect the supplier from liability.
However, the incentive to warn ultimate users may be diminished by
workers' compensation law since employers may be exempt from tort
liability. 122 Even still, there is an incentive for employers to prevent future
accidents that not only injure employees but also damage facilities and result
in loss of profit. Even when the employer-employee context may weaken
cost and accident avoidance incentives, the sophisticated user doctrine also
establishes a level of fairness for suppliers by maintaining a plaintiffs
ability to argue breach.
2.

Fairness

The sophisticated user doctrine provides a layer of protection for
suppliers exposed to liability after the abolishment of the privity
requirement.1 23 Prior to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., a supplier was
only liable to those in direct privity, whereas now a supplier is liable to all
foreseeable users.1 24 In the three-party context, situations arise where a
supplier is unable to shield themselves from liability by using contributory
negligence or assumption of risk since both defenses focus on the conduct of

120. See generally Mark McLaughlin Hager, Don't Say IDidn't Warn You (Even Though
I Didn't): Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law is Wrong, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1125, 1167 (1994).
121. See Ausness, supra note 13, at 1234-35.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (1976) provides the following:
The rights and remedies granted by this title to an employee when he and his
employer have accepted the provisions of this title, respectively, to pay and accept
compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all
other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents,
dependents or next of kin as againsthis employer, at common law or otherwise, on
account of such injury, loss of service or death.
(emphasis added).
123. Willner, supra note 51, at 588; see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E.
1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916).
124. Willner, supra note 51, at 588-89.
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the plaintiff, rather than the negligence of a third party.1 25 Suppliers are
therefore exposed to possible liability with limited opportunities to defend
themselves from a warning claim. In this event, the sophisticated user
doctrine levels the playing field by providing a layer of protection to
suppliers that employers already enjoy through workers' compensation laws.
The fairness aspect of the doctrine ties into the efficiency and capability
incentives that the doctrine creates as well. Employers are often in the best
place to directly communicate warnings to their employees by providing
training programs and workplace safety protocols when handling potentially
dangerous products.1 26 Employers have independent duties under
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations to
provide warnings and training to employees on how to properly handle
dangerous products in the workplace.1 27 Furthermore, many employers have
extensive knowledge of the product and can relay this knowledge to their
employees in a way that they can understand and appreciate. 128 However,
when both the employer and supplier or seller have a duty to warn ultimate
users, they run the risk of overloading the users with cumulative, confusing,
and even contradicting instructions. 129 If users are bombarded by
cumulative, confusing, or contradictory instructions, the accident avoidance
goals of providing warnings are actually undermined.
The sophisticated user doctrine can be a just and practical doctrine in the
three-party context when properly applied. The balancing approach of the
doctrine promotes fairness by giving an upstream supplier protection from
liability when a purchaser has acted negligently by failing to properly warn
its employees, while still affording the injured victim the opportunity to
argue that the supplier acted unreasonably by relying on the purchaser.
In Lawing, the facts support the inference that the defendant's reliance
on the employer to relay safety information to employees was reasonable.
However, the employer failed to take additional steps to ensure that its
employees were aware that the content of the bags was an oxidizer, instead
relying on the labels on the bags of sodium bromate to convey this
information.1 30 The application of the doctrine in this set of facts seems fair

125. Id.
126. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 90, at 37-38.
127. Id. at 38; 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (2006) (establishing communication standards for
employers for a list of hazardous products in the workplace).
128. Schwartz & Appel, supra note 90, at 38 (highlighting the fact that employers are in
the best place to understand the level of "literacy, education and skill level" of their
employees).
129. Id.
130. See Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 20, 749 S.E.2d 126, 12930 (Ct. App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015).
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considering the level of sophistication that the employer had with sodium
bromate. Not only had the employer regularly used sodium bromate in the
course of regular business, but it had also received extensive instructions
directly from the supplier.' 3 ' Further, the case is a prime example of an
employer that is more capable than the supplier to issue efficient and
effective warnings to employees. As Justice Pleicones stated in his dissent in
Lawing II, although the facts of the case are tragic, the sophisticated user
doctrine should apply to protect the upstream suppliers given the
sophistication of the employer to understand the dangers of the sodium
bromate and to protect its employees. 3 2 This portion of the dissent hints at
the fairness argument being made in this Note, and as Justice Pleicones
points out, the tragedy of a case alone should not bar the doctrine's
applicability to a supplier that may have reasonably relied on a purchaser.
IV.

DISCUSSION OF LA WING I: HOW THE COURT SHOULD HAVE ANALYZED
THE SOPHISTICATED USER DOCTRINE

The court in Lawing II states that it was unnecessary to consider the
merits of the sophisticated user doctrine since there was evidence to suggest
that the labels were defective.' 33 Making the adequacy of a warning label on
a product a threshold question for the sophisticated user doctrine is
unnecessary since the purpose of a label is to convey knowledge of the risks
of a product. For the purposes of the doctrine, the adequacy of the label
becomes irrelevant as to the person directly exposed to the product if the
purchaser of the product is sophisticated with the product's dangers. 134
Rather, under a balancing approach, the adequacy of the label should be a
factor to consider when determining whether it was reasonable for the
supplier to rely on the purchaser to convey warnings to subsequent users. 35

131. Id. at 18-19, 749 S.E.2d at 128-29 (explaining that the supplier provided the
employer with a safety data sheet, warnings that the product was an oxidizer and could
explode if exposed to heat, as well as instruction not to store the product near a source of heat
or fire).
132. See Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing II), 415 S.C. 209, 231-32, 781 S.E.2d
548, 560 (2015) (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 227, 781 S.E.2d at 558.
134. Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that
under section 388 of the Restatement, "a factual issue arises about the adequacy of a warning
to an intermediary rather than to the person directly exposed to the danger"); OWEN & DAVIS,
supra note 57.
135. Jones, 723 F.2d at 374; see Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 464 (Md.
1992) (stating that the factors to consider when determining the reasonableness of a supplier's
reliance on the purchaser to warn are: "(1) [T]he dangerous condition of the product; (2) the
purpose for which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; (4) the reliability of
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If the label adequately puts the purchaser on notice about the nature and
characteristics of the product and the purchaser is already sophisticated with
the use of the product, then the sophisticated user doctrine should protect the
supplier from a warning defect claim from the ultimate user.
Furthermore, considering the adequacy of the warning provided when
determining whether the supplier acted reasonably in relying on the
purchaser is a factual issue for the jury to decide, not the court.1 36 Put
another way, a label need not be perfect or even provided at all in some
circumstances for the sophisticated user doctrine to apply, but the
inadequacy of a label may be a factor among others for the jury to consider
in determining whether it was reasonable for the supplier to rely on the
purchaser.1 37 If reliance was reasonable, then the supplier has not breached
its duty and cannot be found liable.
A.

Labeling Adequacy in Lawing

When applying these standards to the Lawing facts, it thus makes more
sense for the adequacy of the label to be a fact in issue for the jury to
consider in determining the reasonableness of the supplier's reliance on the
employer to convey warnings to the plaintiff-employee. Since the adequacy
of the label applies to the "intermediary" and not to those directly exposed to
the product,1 38 it is arguable that the supplier's reliance on the employer to
warn its employees was reasonable since the facts state that the employer
was able to identify the product and had extensive knowledge about the
potential for an explosion if the oxidizer was stored near heat or a source of
fire.1 39 Therefore, the fact that the label was covered by shrink-wrap made

the third party as a conduit of necessary information about the product; (5) the magnitude of
the risk involved; and (6) the burdens imposed on the supplier by requiring that he directly
warn all users") (emphasis added); see also Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174,
179 (3rd Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965)
("[W]here the danger involved in the ignorant use of their quality is great and such means of
disclosure are practicable and not unduly burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should
be required to adopt them.").

136. Jones, 723 F.2d at 374; Hopkins v. Chip-In-Saw, Inc., 630 F.2d 616, 619-21 (8th
Cir. 1980); Barnes v. Litton Indus., 555 F.2d 1184, 1188 (4th Cir. 1977); Dougherty, 540 F.2d
at 178-82.
137. See Webb v. Special Elec. Co., 370 P.3d 1022, 1035 (Cal. 2016).
138. See Ausness, supra note 13, at 1232.

139. Lawing v. Trinity Mfg., Inc. (Lawing 1), 406 S.C. 13, 18, 749 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ct.
App. 2013), rev'd, 415 S.C. 209, 781 S.E.2d 548 (2015) (holding that the employee of
Engelhard (the purchaser/employer) that inspected the shipment of the sodium bromate crates
upon arrival accepted the shipment and recognized that the crates contained sodium bromate
despite the labels being covered by shrink-wrap).
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no difference with regard to the employer's ability to identify the product,
even though the shrink-wrap did make a difference in the plaintiffs ability
to identify the product.' 40
When looking at the adequacy of the labels on the crates of sodium
bromate, the court should have balanced that fact with the other known facts
of the case, such as the supplier's awareness of the employer's extensive
safety features and requirement for hot work permits. There is certainly an
argument that the insufficient labeling overrides the other facts that the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388 calls to be weighed. However,
these facts must be balanced in order to determine reasonableness, otherwise
the sophisticated user doctrine becomes a toothless defense when applied to
a strict liability claim. Stated differently, if a defective warning or label
automatically precludes the application of the doctrine, then every injured
user will be able to get around the doctrine by asserting that the label was
defective in some way, shape, or form, regardless of the supplier's
reasonableness in relying on the purchaser.141 Furthermore, even though the
culpability of the defendant is typically not a primary consideration in strict
products liability claims, reasonableness is still a central question to all
warning defect claims.
In conclusion, the supreme court should have allowed for the
sophisticated user charge to stand rather than making the adequacy of the
labels a dispositive threshold question for the applicability of the doctrine.
B.

Court's Concern with Eliminatinga Supplier'sDuty to Warn

The court in Lawing II also expressed concern that adopting the
sophisticated user doctrine in the three-party context would absolutely
absolve suppliers of their duty to warn.1 42 Considering the factors provided

140. See id. at 20, 749 S.E.2d at 129-30 (where the plaintiff testified that he walked over
to the crates prior to performing work with the cutting torch but could not see "[a]
label . . that told [him he] needed to move" the crates).
141. Reaffirming the concerns of the court in O'Neal that strict liability will essentially
turn into absolute liability. See supra notes 103-104 and surrounding text.
142. Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing II), 415 S.C. 209, 228, 781 S.E.2d 548, 558
(2015) (Pleicones, J., dissenting) ("If we conflate the [adequacy of labeling and the
sophisticated user analysis] . . .we would absolutely absolve suppliers of their responsibility to
label dangerous products during shipment and upon delivery."). Compare that statement to
comment n of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 388, where it says that "if the danger
involved in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may be that the supplier
does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of the necessary
information even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be careful."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the fears expressed by the court would
never come to fruition because a supplier's reasonableness in relying on the
purchaser to warn is always an issue to be considered. The concerns
expressed by the court may be legitimate if a common law duty approach is
adopted for the three-party context, since suppliers would not have a duty to
warn users if the product is purchased by a sophisticated party. However, the
balancing approach, the approach urged by this Note, would place the
supplier's conduct at the forefront of the analysis.
As discussed, supra, the balancing approach of section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts calls for the consideration of several factors
when determining whether it was reasonable for the supplier to rely on the
purchaser to relay warnings to an ultimate user.1 43 Among many others, one
of the factors is whether the supplier provided any warnings at all to the
purchaser.1 44 When the dangers associated with the product are low and the
sophistication of the purchaser in a three-party context is high, the supplier
may be required to provide only minimal warnings, or even no warnings at
all, in order to act reasonably.1 45 However, when the dangers of the product
are high and the difficulty and burden of attaching warnings and labels to the
product is low, a supplier may be required to attach a reasonably detailed
warning for the defense to apply.1 46
A case decided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Willis v.
Raymark Industries, is a good example of why the sophisticated user
doctrine will never act as an absolute release of a supplier from its duty to
warn under the balancing approach. In Willis, the defendant was a supplier
of an asbestos product and sold the product to the plaintiffs employer
without "any attempt" at warning of the dangers of asbestos.1 47 Similar to
Lawing, the defendant argued that the doctrine should shield it from liability
by arguing that the employer had "extensive knowledge of the dangers of
asbestos."1 48 However, the court rejected the defendant's argument since
little evidence was offered that the defendant was aware of the employer's

§ 388 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
144. Id.
145. Webb v. Special Elec. Co., 370 P.3d 1022, 1035 (Cal. 2016) (finding that usually a
supplier must supply warnings to the purchaser in a three-party context, but in the event that
the purchaser had extensive knowledge of the product, the supplier may not be required to
warn and its actions could still be deemed reasonable).
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

388 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("Where

the danger involved in the ignorant use of [the product] . . . is great and such means of
disclosure are practicable and not unduly burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should
be required to adopt them.").
147. Willis v. Raymark Indus., 905 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir. 1990).
148. Id.
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knowledge of the dangers before the plaintiff was ultimately exposed and
injured.1 49 However, unlike Lawing, the court properly ran through the
balancing analysis and compared varying factors to determine the
reasonableness of the defendant's reliance on the purchaser prior to reaching
its conclusion. 150
Therefore, a supplier's duty to warn would not be absolutely absolved
by the sophisticated user doctrine if the Restatement approach is employed
by the court. A supplier must be able to demonstrate to the court that it was
aware of the level of sophistication possessed by the purchaser and that the
purchaser was a trustworthy party to pass along its knowledge to ultimate
users, among other factors. Furthermore, the Lawing II court could have
very likely determined that the supplier acted unreasonably under the
balancing approach by covering the warnings and labels on the product with
shrink-wrap, but it was unnecessary for the court to refuse to adopt the
doctrine and make adequate labeling the threshold question for application
of the doctrine. As pointed out, supra, the difference between making
labeling the threshold question versus weighing it with the totality of the
facts is important. If inadequate labeling acts as an automatic bar to applying
the sophisticated user doctrine, then what force would the defense have in a
strict liability claim?
C.

Confusion with Other Defenses Available to Suppliers

The court's refusal to adopt, or recognize that the sophisticated user
doctrine had already been adopted, will create confusion among suppliers as
to where other defenses end and the sophisticated user doctrine begins.
Rightly so, many suppliers faced with a negligent warning claim may
assume that the sophisticated user defense is no longer available for use in
South Carolina. Suppliers will then need to rely on other defenses or
arguments to mitigate liability. However, it may be more difficult now to
effectively make these arguments without getting too close to a sophisticated
user argument.

149. See id. A similar holding appears in Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., where the
purchaser of an asbestos product was not aware of the dangers until after the product was
supplied to the purchaser by the defendant, and the burden of warning was low compared to
the dangerousness of the product. 764 F.2d 224, 233 (4th Cir. 1985).
150. See Willis, 905 F.2d at 796-97. However, the Lawing II court stated that "we need
not formally adopt the doctrine at this time" because "the proper focus is the labeling on the
sodium bromate shipped to [the employer]." Lawing v. Univar, USA, Inc. (Lawing Il), 415
S.C. 209, 226, 227, 781 S.E.2d 548, 557, 558 (2015).
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For example, a supplier may wish to argue that a defective or inadequate
warning could not have been the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries
because
an effective
warning would not have
altered the
purchaser's/employer's behavior. 15 In essence, the supplier can argue that
the employer's conduct was the cause of the employee's injuries, and the
supplier should therefore not be held liable.' 52 This can be done in the threeparty context by using the "empty chair defense" codified in section 15-3815 of the South Carolina Code.1 53 Since the employer is immune from tort
liability because of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act,1 54 the employer becomes an absent party to the case-i.e., the "empty
chair." Although the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a defendant
cannot use the "empty chair defense" to have the jury apportion fault to an
immune nonparty, a defendant may still argue that its actions were not a
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries by putting the blame on the
employer.

1

In order to do so, however, the supplier will need to introduce evidence
that the employer was aware of the dangers of the product and that a more
effective warning would not have altered how the employer handled the
product.1 56 But how can this be done appropriately without getting too close
to a sophisticated user argument? In many cases, the facts used to suggest
that the employer was the culpable party under the empty chair defense will
be the same as those used by a supplier to argue that its reliance on the
employer was reasonable under the sophisticated user doctrine. Considering
the facts of Lawing, the supplier of sodium bromate would present the jury
with the following facts: the employer regularly used sodium bromate, was
warned and knew of the potential for an explosion, stored the product in an
improper location during a maintenance shutdown week, and failed to
properly warn the plaintiff that sodium bromate was in the area. All of these
facts are relevant for a discussion under either the empty chair or
sophisticated user doctrines. Yet, with the court rejecting the applicability of
the sophisticated user doctrine in South Carolina, a plaintiff may have an

15 1. Joel Slawotsky, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Employer as
Intermediary, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 1059, 1069 (1994).
152. Id.; Machin v. Carus Corp., 419 S.C. 527, 543, 799 S.E.2d 468, 476 (2017) (holding
that a defendant can, "under the well-established 'empty chair' defense, have the right to
present . . . evidence and require the fact-finder to consider whether the employer's actions
were the cause of the plaintiffs injuries"); Smith v. Tiffany, 419 S.C. 548, 557, 799 S.E.2d
479, 484 (2017).
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15 (2014).
154. Machin, 419 S.C. at 543, 799 S.E.2d at 476.
155. Id.
156. See Slawotsky, supra note 151, at 1069.
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opportunity to assert that the defendant is disguising a sophisticated user
argument with an empty chair argument.
Although there is nothing to suggest that this is actually a problem in
South Carolina products liability law, one can imagine the difficulty that
defendants will have in making a distinction between the two defenses going
forward.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, South Carolina should officially adopt
the sophisticated user doctrine. While the form in which the sophisticated
user doctrine is implemented varies from state to state, a majority of
jurisdictions have thought it a necessary tool in some shape or form for
suppliers to have when facing warning claims. In the two-party context, the
sophisticated user doctrine is a practical extension from the open and
obvious danger rule to protect suppliers that sell a product to a
knowledgeable user.
While the doctrine is most easily implemented in the two-party context,
there are scenarios where the doctrine is necessary even when the end user
does not have the same level of sophistication with the product as the
supplier and purchaser. Considering the difficulties that arise in that context,
it is this Note's opinion that the balancing approach laid out by section 388
of the Restatement is better suited for the three-party context. The balancing
approach is fairer than the duty approach when the end user is not
sophisticated because it places the focus of the analysis on the actions of the
supplier, rather than on the user or purchaser. Whereas the duty approach
would extinguish the supplier's duty to warn if the purchaser is sophisticated
or once the supplier warns the purchaser, the balancing approach considers
the reasonableness of the supplier's actions in relying on the purchaser as a
communicator of product warnings. For this reason, an injured end user
would still have a way to seek compensation from a supplier by arguing that
the supplier's conduct was not reasonable. This may not be the case if the
duty approach is implemented since there may not be a duty for the supplier
to breach.
However, the duty approach from a practical standpoint makes more
sense in the two-party context where the purchaser is the sophisticated user.
There should be no duty on a supplier to warn a user that already appreciates
the dangers of the product. In essence, this is the open and obvious danger
doctrine with another name. The only distinction between the two is that the
open and obvious danger rule relates to generally known dangers to the
average person, whereas the sophisticated user doctrine applies to dangers
that may not be generally known to an average person but are certainly
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known to the specific user because of his or her level of knowledge with the
product.
After Lawing, it is evident that the South Carolina Supreme Court is
especially concerned with applying the doctrine in the three-party context.
Understandably, applying the doctrine becomes more difficult when an end
user is harmed by a product that he or she has little knowledge about. Had
the Lawing facts been a two-party situation in which the ultimate user was
knowledgeable, the court may very well have upheld the sophisticated user
jury charge. Yet the overall conclusion of this Note is that the balancing
approach of the doctrine is equitable for both sides the supplier and end
user. It provides the supplier a chance to defend itself from liability when a
sophisticated "intermediary" acts negligently, as well as provides the end
user a platform to argue that the supplier acted unreasonably and breached a
duty to warn.
The balancing approach is also a better approach for South Carolina
specifically since it has already been implemented and thoroughly discussed
by both the Bragg and Lawing I courts. Realistically, products liability
attorneys may not find clarity in the existence of the doctrine until the court
either has a chance to consider it again or is presented with certified
questions from the federal circuit. 11 Until then, it appears that the doctrine
has been killed by dicta.
ChristopherHenry

157. This was the case with the "empty chair" issue in Machin v. Carus Corp. as applied
to an immune nonparty employer. 419 S.C. at 530-31, 799 S.E.2d at 469-70.
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